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PERSONAL INJURY - CONFLICT OF LAws - Tsakonites v. Transpacific
Carriers Corp., 368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966).- Plaintiff, a Greek sea-
man, was injured on board a Greek vessel berthed at a pier in Brooklyn
and brought suit in federal court under the Jones Act Notwithstanding
the situs of the accident and the residence in the United States of the
principal stockholder of the defendant corporation, the federal district court
dismissed the action and ruled that plaintiff's employment contract limited
his rights to those arising under Greek law.
In affirming, the court of appeals balanced the legitimate interests of
plaintiff and the United States against the policies underlying international
comity and deemed the law of the flag "to be of cardinal importance."
The dissenting opinion considered the defendant's contact with the United
States sufficient to warrant jurisdiction and argued that shipowners who
are resident aliens and shipowners who are United States citizens should
be subject to the same liabilities while their vessels are at United States
piers.
AUTOMOBILES
UNiNsURED MoOSTS - REQuIR MINIMUM COVERAGE - Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Fusco, 223 A.2d 447 (R.I. 1966). - A Rhode Island statute
requires a $10,000-$20,000 minimum provision for uninsured automobiles
in all policies of insurers who are authorized to do business in the state
and who voluntarily contract with an insured. Plaintiff, who had pro-
vided for the statutory minimum in its policy, sought to enjoin defendant-
appellant from proceeding to arbitration. Defendant's deceased was killed
while a passenger in an automobile whose owner had contracted with an-
other insurer for a $5,000-$10,000 coverage limitation. The state supreme
court held that defendant could recover the difference in the two policies
from decedent's insurer.
Although plaintiff defined "uninsured automobile" as one having no
insurance coverage, the court concluded that it must have been the legisla-
tive intent to consider "uninsured automobile" as one which did not meet
the statutory minimum amount. Thus, the decision embraces the general
rule that an insurer's construction of its policy is subject to the legislative
fiat and must be construed in light of social policy.
BANKRup'rcY
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO POssEsSION - LIcENsm_ - Kennedy v. Powell,
366 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1966). - Under Arizona law, deposits by con-
tractors to the state before issuance of a license were withdrawable one
year after termination of the license if no claims against them existed.
In the case at bar, after revocation of a contractor's license, joint judgments
against him and the state treasurer were obtained by various creditors
prior to and after his filing of a petition in bankruptcy.
Affirming the district court's decision that the deposit should be sur-
rendered to the referee in bankruptcy, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
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treating the deposit as one for the protection of third persons rather than
as a performance bond, held that such a deposit "might have been . . .
seized, impounded, or sequestered" by either the state or the contractor's
creditors, thereby fulfilling the requirements of "property" as defined by
section 70(a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act. By so deciding, the rights of
creditors injured by the contractor's failure to perform his duties under
a particular construction contract were relegated to the same position as
those of the bankrupt's general creditors.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
MANDAMUS - EXISTENCE AND ADEQUACY OF OTHER REMEDIES - State
ex rel. Fed. Homes Properties, Inc. v. Singer, 9 Ohio St. 2d 95, 223 N.E.2d
824 (1966). - In a mandamus action originating in the court of appeals,
relators sought to compel the Cleveland building commissioner to issue a
building permit for the construction of a twenty-seven suite apartment
Subsequent to the filing for this permit, the property in question was
rezoned for two-family use. After the commissioner had ruled that the
relator's specifications did not conform to the municipal building code,
the court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus conditioned upon compli-
ance with the code, and the commissioner appealed.
In a per curiam opinion the Ohio Supreme Court held the writ to
be improper, its true function being to compel the performance of a pre-
existing duty after all other remedies have been exhausted. The dissenting
opinion found the writ to be proper because of the "inaction and derelic-
tion" by the commissioner. These two opinions thus reflect differing
views within the court as to the relevancy of the prospective likelihood
of success when considering whether all other remedies have been ex-
hausted.
MANDAMUS - JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY - State ex rel. Durek v.
Masheter, 9 Ohio St. 2d 76, 223 N.E.2d 601 (1967).-Relator, owner-opera-
tor of a grocery and carryout store, brought an action for mandamus to compel
respondent, the director of highways, to institute appropriation proceedings
in order to compensate for an alleged "taking" of property. The court
of appeals, exercising original jurisdiction, denied the writ, holding that
there was no "taking" of the relator's property.
The supreme court held that mandamus was properly denied but inti-
mated that the lower court's holding was not necessarily correct. The
court stated that mandamus must not issue when there is a plain and ade-
quate remedy at law and that whatever remedy the relator had should
have been asserted in the court of common pleas by an appropriate form
of action - mandatory injunction or statutory mandamus. In a concur-
ring opinion, Mr. Justice Herbert agreed that an ordinary legal remedy
was available to relator but indicated that the majority failed to realize
that their suggested appropriate forms of action were extraordinary reme-
dies and that if the availability of mandamus in a lower court affected the
authority of the court of appeals or the supreme court, then those courts
had lost part of their constitutional grant of jurisdiction.
RIGHT OF INSPECTION - Loss OF PROFITS - Klein v. Bendix Westing-
house Automotive Air Brake Co., 8 Ohio App. 2d 271, 221 N.E.2d 722
(1966). - Plaintiff purchased a coin-operated dry cleaning machine which
utilized parts made by defendant. The machine broke down and plaintiff
1060 [Vol. 18: 1059
CASES NOTED
brought an action for breach of warranty, alleging loss of profits. The
trial court allowed defendant to inspect the machine but provided no safe-
guards as to the means by which the inspection was to be carried out.
The appellate court agreed that inspection should be allowed in a loss of
profits action even though the inspection was ordered on a motion rather
than a petition. However, the court stipulated that the parry seeking
examination of the chattel must sustain the cost of an independent testing
laboratory's inspection and of all other costs which arise from disassembling
the machine.
The case represents an extension of the right of inspection to situations
in which economic loss is suffered. However, the court was careful to
restrict the right of investigation to one carried out under proper safe-
guards.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FpREEDOM OF THE PRESS - RIGHT To REFUSE ADVBRTISING - Bloss v'.
Federated Publications, Inc., 145 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966). -
Plaintiff, owner of a motion picture theater, claimed damages against de-
fendant newspaper for refusing to publish an advertisement. Plaintiffs
suit was based on an Ohio case [Uhlman v. Sherman, 31 Ohio Dec. 54
(1919)] holding that newspapers are affected with a public interest and
as such must accept advertising. Defendant raised the freedom of contract
theory as a defense, claiming that it was under no duty to accede to plain-
tiffs demand.
The court granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that
a newspaper is not affected with a public interest After distinguishing
the Ohio case, the court noted that the weight of authority supports the
conclusion that a newspaper is a private corporation and freedom of the
press is best served if newspapers are left free from public regulation.
HABEAS CoRPuS - RIGHT TO COUN SEL - People ex rel Harris v.
Ogilvie, 221 NXE.2d 265 (I. 1966). - Defendant was arrested in BE1i-
nois pursuant to a rendition warrant issued by the governor of Texas.
Defendant was advised of his right to demand and procure counsel as
stipulated in the Illinois Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. The act did
not stipulate that defendant had an absolute right to counsel. At trial it
was successfully argued that a habeas corpus proceeding is civil in nature
and therefore the constitutional right to counsel does not exist.
The Illinois Supreme Court, recognizing the importance of a pre-
conviction hearing to the defendant and the expertise required to maintain
a proper defense, held that the distinction made - considering habeas
corpus proceedings to be civil in nature - was incorrect and that a fair
interpretation of the act requires the court to appoint counsel.
RIGHT OF PRIVACY - Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324,
221 NB.2d 543 (1966). - Defendants published a biography of plain-
tiff, a famous baseball player, without his consent. The work contained
factual errors, distortions, and fanciful passages. Section 51 of New York's
Civil Rights Law authorizes the double remedy of money damages and
injunctive relief where a person's "name, portrait or picture is used within
the state for advertising or for purposes of trade" without written consent.
By holding that plaintiff was entitled to relief under the statute, the New
York Court of Appeals limited its prior holdings to the effect that now
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only truthful accounts of public figures such as plaintiff would escape
statutory liability.
In disposing of the contention that such a ruling would deny defend-
ant's rights guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments, the court
distinguished the instant case from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), defendant's primary support, by saying that Sullivan
only prohibited a state from awarding damages for libel in actions brought
by public officials against critics of their official conduct, whereas it would
serve no useful public purpose to protect a fictionalized biography.
TAXATION - PRmLEGEs AND LuNITImS - Borden v. Selden, 146
N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 1966). - Plaintiffs, individual nonresident owners
of agricultural land in Iowa, brought suit for a dedaratory judgment to
determine the constitutionality of an amendment to the Iowa Agricultural
Land Tax Act of 1945 making agricultural land tax credit available only
to land owned by residents. The trial court held that the statute was
constitutional.
In reversing, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the act violated the
privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution because
the classification into residents and nonresidents made by the statute was
not a reasonable means of accomplishing its purposes. The court adopted
the well-established rule that the privileges and immunities clause bars
discrimination against citizens of other states where there is no substantial
reason for the discrimination beyond the fact that they are citizens of
other states.
CONTRACTS
MENTAL HEALTH - DISABILITIES AND PRIVILEGEs OF MENTALLY DIS-
ORDERED PERSONS - Edmunds v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 223 A.2d
630 (D.C. Cir. 1966). - Plaintiff was appointed by a Maryland court
as conservatrix of the estate of Vivian Edmunds, who, with a Miss Lupton,
held a joint savings account in the defendant District of Columbia bank.
At the time of her appointment, plaintiff notified defendant of this fact
and also that the passbook was missing. The bank thereafter permitted
Miss Lupton to withdraw money from the account upon presentation of
a withdrawal slip and a lost passbook receipt signed by both Lupton and
Edmunds. Plaintiff, after the death of Edmunds, sued the bank to recover
the withdrawn sum on the theory that Edmunds lacked the capacity to
sign for the withdrawal.
In affirming the summary judgment for defendant, the court of appeals
held that the ward's signature was valid and enforceable. The court found
no Maryland cases on point but decided that the Maryland statutes pro-
viding for the appointment of a conservator dearly indicate that the ward
is not a person of unsound mind and do not affect his capacity to contract.
RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PRINCIPAL - SuIT AGAINST THE UNITED
STATES - United States v. Acme Process Equip. Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 350
(1966). - Respondent, a prime contractor, brought an action against the
United States in the Court of Claims to recover damages for breach of
a contract under which respondent undertook through itself and sub-
contractors to manufacture recoilless rifles. The United States alleged it
had rightfully canceled the contract because three of respondent's principal
employees had accepted compensation for awarding subcontracts in viola-
tion of the Anti-Kickback Act of 1946. The Court of Claims, relying on
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its findings that none of the respondent's officers were aware of the kick-
backs, construed the act as not authorizing government cancellation.
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court held that since kickback
devices increase the cost of the prime contract to the government, public
policy requires that the United States be able to annul a contract tainted
by kickbacks. The Court also stated that because the three principal em-
ployees were in the upper echelon of management, the corporation was re-
sponsible for their conduct.
CORPORATIONS
CORPORATE PRACTICE - COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICATION RULES
Application of Community Action for Legal Servs., Inc., 274 N.Y.S.2d
779 (1966). - Petitioners, made application to the court, in a procedure
authorized by statute, for permission to incorporate to practice law. The
three groups of petitioners were independent entities but were to be re-
lated through a pyramid-like administrative structure for the channeling
of federal legal aid funds to area agencies. The boards of directors were
to have both lay and professional members. The applications were rejected
by the court.
Numerous defects and errors were noted in the proposed structures as
the court attempted to provide dear guidelines for future use. The major
defects were the overlapping of control, the excessive layers of organiza-
tion, and the inherent incentive to competitive anti-poverty law offices
which, the court felt, would preclude effective professional and disciplinary
supervision. The laymen on the boards of directors were also objected to
as a possible intervening factor between attorneys and clients. The deci-
sions exhaustive analysis of the many problems relating to the organization
of effective legal aid corporations brings some clarity to an area of the
law that is presently chaotic.
CRIMINAL LAW
FORGERY - STATE EXPENSEs AND CHARGES - People v. Watson, 221
N.E.2d 645 (IML 1966). - Defendant, an indigent, was found guilty of
attempting to commit forgery by delivery of a forged traveler's check.
Prior to trial, defendant's attorney filed a motion requesting the court to
provide him with funds in order to obtain the services of a document
examiner. The motion was denied.
In reversing and remanding for a new trial, the court ruled that in
order to receive a fair trial, defendant had the constitutional right to a
reasonable fee allotted by the state for the purpose of having an expert
document examiner testify concerning defendants handwriting. This is
one of the first decisions in which a state court has extended the payment
of expert testimony fees to a noncapital case where expert testimony is
deemed crucial to a proper defense.
HOMICIDE - CAUSE OF DEATH - Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 223 A.2d
291 (Pa. 1966). - Defendant was convicted of first degree murder for
stabbing his victim in the abdomen, although death was not immediate.
An operation was performed whereby a tube was inserted in the victim's
stomach to prevent post-operative complications. Following the operation,
the victim, in a disoriented mental state, pulled out the tube, eventually
causing his death.
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The state supreme court upheld the conviction, stating that the victim's
act of pulling out the tube did not create an independent intervening cause.
One dissent was filed, stating that the majority had violated state prece-
dent by applying the tort concept of proximate cause to a homicide prose-
cution even though proof of homicide requires a more direct causal con-
nection. Other courts, however, have followed the majority rationale and
have not distinguished between the tort and criminal concepts of proximate
cause.
INDIGENTS - FUNDS PROVIDED FOR TAKING DEPOsInoNs - State v.
Stark, 9 Ohio App. 2d 42, 222 N.E.2d 794 (1966). - An indigent de-
fendant in a criminal case sought to have her assigned counsel take the
deposition of a material witness who could not be subpoenaed. The trial
court twice overruled her motion and suggested that either the witness be
made available at trial or the deposition be taken as an interrogatory.
On appeal the defendant was found to have a constitutional right to
have the deposition taken by assigned counsel with compensation provided
by the state. However, to save the state a financial burden, the court
held that the applicable statute did not prohibit the court from appointing
a special or additional assigned counsel, in this case a military commission,
to represent the accused at the taking of the deposition.
PROCEDURE - JURSDICriON OVER A MINOR - State V. Peterson, 9 Ohio
Misc. 154 (Cincinnati Munic. Ct. 1966). - Sentenced in traffic court
on a plea of guilty, a minor moved for a new trial, alleging that the court
lacked jurisdiction over her. In denying the motion the municipal court
held that even if defendant's guilty plea did not preclude her motion for
a new trial, she had waived her right to question the court's jurisdiction.
Ohio statutes vest juvenile courts with exclusive jurisdiction over juve-
niles, but the court held that the statutory provisions apply only to cases
in which minority is discovered or disclosed before trial. Following the
majority rule the court held that the same standard as to waiver of juris-
diction applies equally to juveniles and adults and that by failing to season-
ably question the court's jurisdiction, defendant had waived the right.
DIVORCE
ALLOWANCE FOR COUNSEL FEES AND EXPENSES - DECREE - Wong
v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. Rptr. 782 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). - Petitioner
was originally represented in a divorce action by the real party in interest
in the instant case. After receiving testimony as to the value of the
services of the respective attorneys for the petitioner and his wife, the
court advised both counsel to amend their pleadings to conform to this
testimony and to include a prayer for attorney fees. Accordingly, peti-
tioner's attorney filed an amendment for the reasonable value of his ser-
vices, and on the same day petitioner discharged the real party in interest
and engaged his present counsel. Later, an interlocutory judgment of
divorce was decreed in which the community property was evaluated. Out
of the community property in his possession, petitioner was ordered to
pay the attorney fees, which were enumerated in the amended complaint.
To prevent the respondent superior court from enforcing this portion of
the decree, the petitioner requested the court of appeals to issue a writ
of prohibition.
The court of appeals granted the writ and held that the respondent
exceeded its jurisdiction in this divorce suit by entering a judgment in
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favor of the petitioner's attorney who was not a party to the action. In
so holding, the court followed the general rule that a judgment may not
be recorded either for or against a person who is not a party to the pro-
ceeding. Any judgment which does so is void to that extent.
FOREIGN DIVORCE - FuLL FAITH AND CREDIT - Weber v. Weber,
274 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Family Ct. 1966). - This action was brought to
compel a father to comply with an agreement incorporated in a Mexican
divorce decree. The agreement was that the father would provide support
and maintenance to the child "while he is attending and is a fuiltime
student at a college or school, even though he shall be twenty-one or
over...." The father relied upon section 443 of the Family Court Act
which, as amended in 1966, limited his liability for the support of a child
to the latter's minority. From an adverse judgment, the father moved to
vacate.
In denying the motion, the court held that the statute did not indi-
cate an intent of the legislature to restrict enforcement of agreements
incorporated into decrees by courts of competent jurisdiction outside New
York. The court further held that full faith and credit should be afforded
the divorce decrees of foreign states where both parties have been repre-
sented.
PARTIEs - STATE'S INTEREST - McLean v. Grabowski, 224 A.2d 157
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1966). - Plaintiff brought suit for custody and support
after receiving a one-day divorce in Alabama, in which defendant had
filed an appearance through his wife. Defendant counterclaimed to void
the divorce decree and to secure a divorce on the ground of adultery.
The parties settled their differences and plaintiff moved for dismissal.
The court denied the motion and appointed counsel to contest the divorce
decree.
On appeal, the court affirmed the inherent power of the chancery divi-
sion to appoint counsel to represent the interests of the state, holding that
the state is a third party to every divorce and is represented by the court,
which can, to satisfy its judicial conscience, actively participate in the
proceedings.
EMINENT DOMAIN
MEASURE AND AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION - TIME WITH REFERENCE
TO WHICH COMPENSATION MAY BE MADE - Housing Authority v.
Schroeder, 151 S.E.2d 226 (Ga. 1966). - Plaintiff condemned defend-
anes apartment building as part of an urban renewal project. The trial
court charged the jury that, in determining just compensation for the prop-
erty, it could consider the fact that the news that the building was to be
taken for urban renewal purposes led several of defendan's tenants to va-
cate their apartments early and thus caused defendant's property to depre-
ciate in value before the taking.
In reversing the judgment for plaintiff, the Georgia Supreme Court
held that the court's charge was erroneous in that it allowed the jury to
consider the value of the property at a time prior to the taking. The
court thus refused to make an exception to the well-settled general rule
that compensation for condemned property is to be measured by the value
of the property at the time of the taking, that is, at the time of title trans-
fer.
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EVIDENCE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE - PRIVATE MEMORANDA AND STATEMENTS IN
GENERAL - Arnovitz V. Wozar, 9 Ohio App. 2d 16 (1964). - The
case arose out of an automobile collision which occurred at a highway
intersection, the traffic through which was controlled by a traffic light.
Both plaintiff and defendant claimed that they entered the intersection
while the traffic signal was green, and plaintiff offered an eye witness to
the accident. On cross-examination, defendanes counsel questioned the
witness from a written statement made by the witness one month after
the accident. Prior to re-direct, counsel for plaintiff moved the court to
permit plaintiff to inspect the statement. The motion was granted but
defendant refused to comply with the court's order, and judgment was
subsequently entered for defendant.
Claiming that it was misconduct on the part of defendanes counsel to
refuse to allow him to inspect the statement, plaintiff appealed. The ap-
pellate court reversed, holding that counsel has a right to the exclusive pos-
session of a witness' prior statement but when the writing is used for any
evidential purpose, fairness requires that he submit it for the opponent's
inspection. The position of the court is that followed by a majority of
the courts in the United States.
INSURANCE
CONSENT JUDGMENT - SUBROGATION RIGHTS - Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., 151 S.E.2d 14 (N.C 1966).-Defendant's
truck damaged the car of a third party who was insured by plaintiff.
Under an insurance policy it had issued, plaintiff was obligated to pay the
insured the cost of the damage less a fixed deduction and upon payment
was subrogated to the claim of the insured. After receipt of the payment,
the insured brought an action against defendant for the full amount of
the damage. The defendant, with knowledge of plaintiff's subrogation
rights and without its consent, entered into a settlement with the insured
in the form of a consent judgment which included a full release of all
subsequent claims. Plaintiff sued the defendant to recover the amount of
its payment to the insured.
The court, in finding that the release would not bar the subsequent
suit by plaintiff, followed the rule that a settlement made with full knowl-
edge of the subrogation rights of another and without the consent or par-
ticipation of the subrogated party will not defeat the claim of the subroga-
tee even though the tort-feasor is entitled to have the total amount of
damages against him ascertained in one action.
JUDGMENT
BY DEFAULT - OPENING OR SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT - United Ac-
counts, Inc. v. Lantz, 145 N.W.2d 488 (N.D. 1966). - The Supreme
Court of North Dakota affirmed an order vacating a default judgment
which had been entered for plaintiff six and one-half years before. Under
North Dakota law when a defendant fails to make an appearance within
the allotted time, the plaintiff may move for a default judgment without
giving notice to the defendant, but where there has been an appearance,
notice is required. The appearance in this case was after the prescribed
time but before plaintiff had moved for a default judgment.
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The court held, that where there had been no attempt to enforce the
judgment, the defendant's motion to vacate would not be considered un-
timely even though made some six and one-half years after the default
judgment was entered. It further held that where the defendant served an
answer after the prescribed time but before the plaintiff moved for a de-
fault judgment, the defendant had made an "appearance" sufficient to en-
title him to written notice prior to a hearing on the motion for a default
judgment.
SATISFACTION - ENTRY OF CREDITS ON AND PROCEEDINGS To CONMEL
SATISFACTION - Edwards v'. Passarelli Bros. Automotive Serv., 8 Ohio St.
2d 6, 221 N.E.2d 708 (1966). - Defendant's vehicle struck plaintiff's
automobile, thereby causing bodily injury to plaintiff and property damage.
Thereafter, defendant's insurer on separate occasions paid money either to
plaintiff or towards his hospital bill. For each of these payments, plaintiff
signed a written agreement which stated that the sum received would be
credited to the total amount of any final settlement or judgment in favor
of plaintiff for the damages caused by the accident Afterwards, the case
went to trial and resulted in a judgment for plaintiff. After the judgment
had become final, defendant paid into court a sum representing the judg-
ment in full with interest and costs less the total amount of the advance
payments. Defendant then filed a motion for the entry of an order of
satisfaction of judgment. The trial court entered this motion and the court
of appeals unanimously affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, while noting that the case presented a
novel problem to Ohio and perhaps to the whole country, also affirmed.
It was held that where an advance payment is made to a possible tort
claimant with the understanding that such payment is to be credited to the
amount of any final judgment, the proper procedure to effect this agree-
ment is by a post-judgment motion for a credit toward satisfaction of the
judgment.
LABOR LAw
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE - JOINT EMPLOYER BARGAINING - NLRB v,.
Checker Cab Co., 367 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1966). - The Checker Cab
Company and its member owners refused to bargain collectively following
the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) certification of a union be-
cause the bargaining unit required 286 employers to bargain jointly. The
union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB.
The court of appeals enforced the NLRB's unfair labor practice finding
on the basis that it had properly taken into consideration the past history
of the employers - banding together to provide joint machinery for the
hiring of employees, establishing work rules, giving operating instruction,
and disciplining - and held that the NLRB has the power to create a
multi-employer bargaining unit when historically the indicia of control
warrants joint bargaining.
LICENSES
FEDERAL STATUTES AS TO SALE OF SECURITIES - PERSONS LIABLE -
Brenner v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind.
1966). - A brokerage firm which solicited orders for stock in defendant
corporation used these funds in speculation and subsequently went bankrupt
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thereby failing to deliver the stock. Plaintiff brought a class action against
defendant, alleging that by its failure to report the brokerage firm's viola-
tions of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, it had
aided and abetted the utilization of fraudulent schemes in the sale of stock.
Defendant moved to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted. The district court denied the motion, holding that
a valid claim was stated and that relief could be granted if facts were
proven supporting the allegations.
In so holding the court refused to draw any inferences from congres-
sional non-action on proposed amendments to the act and found justifica-
tion for its decision in the remedial nature of the statute which called for
a flexible interpretation of its provisions.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
COMPUTATION OF PERIOD - IGNORANCE OF CAUSE OF ACMION - Hous-
ton v. Florida-Georgia Television Co., 192 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966). - A federal moonshine raid was covered by agents of defendant.
While photographing the activities, the agents also photographed plaintiffs,
owners of adjoining land, who were watching the raid. The pictures were
televised that same day. Plaintiffs sued for invasion of privacy, and al-
though a four-year statute of limitations governed the action, plaintiffs
sought to avoid its effect by arguing the statute should not start to run
until their alleged date of first knowledge of the tort. The trial court
rejected this argument and dismissed the complaint; this holding was af-
firmed on appeal.
The court noted that the statute did not provide that the period begins
only when the injured party obtains knowledge or notice of the invasion
and, applying an expressio unius argument, rejected plaintiff's argument.
Case law from other jurisdictions was also used. The result, although harsh,
is supported by the great weight of authority.
INJumEs To PROPERTY - La Tray v. Mannix Elec. Co., 419 P.2d 744
(Mont. 1966). - Plaintiffs instituted an action to recover for the loss of
services of their minor children caused by a collision with a truck operated
by defendant's servant. The defense of the statute of limitations was inter-
posed, giving rise to issues concerning the nature of the cause of action
itself and the correct statute of limitations to apply. The court, approving
an Indiana court's resolution of the problem, held that such an action is
one to protect an intangible property right and is governed by the statute
of limitations for actions to recover for loss of personal property. Plaintiffs
were thereby barred by operation of that statute for failure to bring the
action within two years.
In so holding, the Montana court followed the traditional view that the
right in question, absent a specific statutory definition to the contrary, is
a property right governed by the personal property statute of limitations.
ISSUANCE OR SERvICE OF PROCESS - SERvICE ON PART OF THE DEFEND-
ANTS - Cook v. Sears, 9 Ohio App. 2d 197, 223 N.E.2d 613 (1967). -
In a will contest service was had on several but not all of twelve organiza-
tional legatees within six months of the will's admission to probate. Orno
REv. CODE § 2305.17 provides, in part, that civil actions commence as to
all defendants united in interest upon the date of service of process upon
any one of the defendants so united, or upon the date of the first diligent
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but unsuccessful attempt to serve, if service is perfected within sixty days.
Some of the legatees were not so served within sixty days. Before trial,
the court granted the motion of one of the defendants to dismiss the action
for failure to join all necessary parties.
Plaintiff appealed and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the
statutory provision requiring service upon a defendant within sixty days
of the first diligent attempt has no application to that portion of the
statute which places the commencement of the action at the date of service
upon any one of the defendants united in interest The court stated that
the action commenced as to all organizational legatees when the first such
legatee was served and that plaintiff had until the trial date to effect ser-
vice upon the others.
SMUNIcIPAL. CORPORATIONS
ORDINANCES - PUBLICATION - Tirpack v. Maro, 9 Ohio App. 2d 76,
222 N.E.2d 830 (1967). - Plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendants from
operating a gasoline station in violation of a zoning ordinance. The ordi-
nance did not contain any language which defined the boundaries of the
respective zones. Instead, a map which set forth the boundaries was in-
corporated by reference into the regulation but was not published with the
text of the ordinance.
Upon appeal on questions of law and fact, the court denied the injunc-
tion on the grounds that the publication of the map was mandatory and
failure to do so created a defense to any suit or prosecution. In so hold-
ing, the court followed the majority rule that the entire zoning ordinance,
including maps, must be published; otherwise, the zoning resolution be-
comes invalid, ineffective, or unenforceable.
SUSPENSION OF EMPLOY1ES - FREEDOM oF SPEECH - Beishaw v. City
of Berkeley, 54 Cal. Rptr. 727 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). - Plaintiff fireman
petitioned for mandamus to direct the city of Berkeley to vacate and ex-
punge from the city's records his thirty-day suspension and to pay him
the salary which would have been due him had he not been suspended.
The city's ground for suspension was a "letter to the editor" written by
plaintiff criticizing a salary distinction between beginning policemen and
beginning firemen. The city alleged that this letter breached its personnel
rules and regulations; the trial court granted judgment for plaintiff and
the city appealed.
The appellate court affirmed the decision, reasoning that a public em-
ployee cannot be barred from employment in violation of his constitutional
rights. The constitutional right to free speech with respect to a municipal
employee is that he may speak freely as long as he does not impair the
administration of the public service in which he is engaged. The court
concluded that the plaintiff's letter was nothing more than an exercise of
free speech with no showing of impairment to the police or fire depart-
ment.
NEGLIGENCE
PROXIMATE CAUSE - LACK OF SEAT BELTS - Mortenson v. Southern
Pac. Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 851 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). - Decedent was
killed in a highway accident while driving a company truck which was not
equipped with seat belts. An action for wrongful death was brought under
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the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA). Defendant railroad con-
tended that the lack of seat belts was not the cause of the accident and
therefore no proximate cause was established between its failure to install
seat belts and the accident which caused death. Plaintiff presented the
testimony of a physicist and two highway patrolmen to substantiate his
contention that seat belts are effective in reducing fatalities and minimiing
injuries. The trial court sustained defendant's motion to nonsuit plaintiff,
holding that there was no issue of negligence to go to the jury.
The appellate court interpreted the FELA as expressly holding the
defendant liable if death was caused even in the slightest part by its negli-
gence. Reasoning that the number of highway collisions in the area af-
forded a basis for finding that a collision could foreseeably force a car off
the road, the court held that recovery under the FELA was not precluded
by lack of evidence as to proximate cause.
STANDARD o CARE - GAS - Roberts v. Indiana Gas & Water Co., 221
N.E.2d 693 (Ind. Ct. App. 1966). - Appellant was injured in the explo-
sion of a building in which gas lines were being bled. Workmen bleeding
the lines used their sense of smell to determine whether gas was leaking.
The effectiveness of this common and accepted practice relied upon the
customary odorization of the gas by appellee, a practice which had been
discontinued without notice.
The court in a split opinion overruled appellee's demurrer, stating that
while there was no original duty to odorize the gas, once this was under-
taken the gas company was bound to exercise reasonable care. The court
thus followed the reasoning of many cases which hold that one who volun-
tarily undertakes a duty is held to a reasonable standard of care in its dis-
continuance.
STANDARD OF CARE - SEAT BELTS - Brown v. Kendurick, 192 So. 2d
49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). - In a negligence action plaintiff, a minor
guest passenger riding in an automobile owned by defendant and driven
by his minor son, recovered a sixteen-thousand-dollar judgment. A Florida
district court of appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and ruled
that defendant could not offer, as a basis for contributory negligence, the
failure of plaintiff to use a seat belt.
In its decision the appellate court arrived at a directly contrary result
to that reached by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Sims v. Sims,
148 S.E.2d 154 (S.C. 1966). It thus appears that the few jurisdictions
that have considered this modem safety device as a proper standard of
care are in conflict.
PARENT AND CHILD
CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF CHILD - PERSONS ENTITLED - Smith v.
Painter, 408 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). - An injunctive action
was brought by a child's maternal grandfather to compel the child's natural
father and adoptive mother to permit him visitation rights. The court
held that in the absence of any showing that the parents are unfit and
that their continued control is not in the best interest of the child, the
parents may exclude anyone from visiting the child, and no cause of action
arises in favor of the grandparents.
This was a case of first impression in Texas, and the court's rationale
stresses the right of the natural parents over all third parties. However,
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the observation by the court that there had been no showing of unfitness
of the parents, suggests that the modem view - that the best interests of
the child is the paramount consideration - prevails and that given a clear
showing of the unfitness of the parents, third parties may intervene.
UNEMANCIPATED CHILD - TORT LIABILITY OF PARENT - Briere v.
Briere, 224 A.2d 588 (N.H. 1966). - Defendant attempted to dismiss
an action brought by his unemancipated children for personal injuries aris-
ing out of an automobile accident The Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire sustained plaintiffs' exceptions and held that unemancipated minor
children can maintain a tort action against their father for their injuries.
It has been generally accepted in a majority of American jurisdictions
that an unemancipated minor child has no cause of action against a parent
for negligence. However, the existence of an additional relationship or of
a malicious intent to injure has supported the minor's suit in some juris-
dictions. This appears to be the first case where a court allowed a minor
to sue a parent for simple negligence within the pure family relation.
SUREYSHIP
BROKERS - SURETY'S LIABILITY - United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Mc-
Daniel, 408 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). - Appellant surety
company executed a statutory real estate bond with appellee but did not
participate in any activity with the broker which would give rise to an
action for damages. In the lower court an amount was recovered from
appellant which included compensatory and exemplary damages, the total
amount being within the bond's limits. The broker's statute provided
that the principal "shall pay any judgment recovered by any person in
any suit for damages or injuries caused by violation of this act." In hold-
ing that appellant was not liable for exemplary damages, the court relied
on attachment and sequestration bond cases as precedent even though these
statutes have no provision for recovery of "any judgment." The court
reasoned that "any judgment" was only a condition of liability, in that
judgment must first be obtained against the principal before the surety
becomes liable. The extent of coverage is defined by the words "for dam-
ages or injuries caused by violation of this act."
The court thus followed the majority rule by awarding compensatory
but denying exemplary damages even if within the limits of the bond, as
long as the surety is not a participant in the malicious and/or fraudulent
conduct of the broker.
TORTS
CHARITIES - RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES - Bell v. Presbytery of
Boise, 421 P.2d 745 (Idaho 1966). - Plaintiff sued a church and a non-
profit corporation controlling several churches for injuries suffered by his
minor son when he fell from a cliff during an outing being supervised
by volunteer church members. Plaintiff alleged that defendants were cov-
ered by insurance up to $100,000 and that the payment of plaintiff's medi-
cal bills by the insurer constituted a waiver of any immunity which existed.
The trial court struck these allegations and rendered summary judgment for
defendants.
In reversing and remanding, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of charitable immunity was abolished in the state. The court
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cited earlier Idaho cases which had eliminated charitable immunity except
where the plaintiff was a nonpaying recipient of the benefits of the charity,
and by this decision joined the modern trend of decisions toward the
total abrogation of charitable immunity.
IMMUNITY - PARENT AND CHILD - Kemp v. Rockland Leasing, Inc.,
274 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Sup. Ct. 1966). - Plaintiff was the unemancipated
daughter of the driver of the automobile in which she was riding when
she sustained injuries. Defendant corporation employed the mother and
claimed that the mother's parent-child immunity required the court to dis-
miss a personal injury suit brought against it as owner of the automobile.
The court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the defense of
parent-child immunity is to prevent family disruption and that since the
reason for the immunity is not present in a suit by the child against the
parent's employer, the employer may not assert immunity as a defense.
The court noted previous cases where liability of the employer had
been upheld on the basis of respondeat superior, but denied that the exist-
ence of statutory liability insurance was a controlling factor in the case.
While it is true that the existence of liability insurance has no effect
upon the merits of the cause of action, the court cited New York prece-
dent as well as leading cases of other jurisdictions which enumerate the
requirement of automobile liability insurance as an important reason for
not extending parent-child immunity to the parent's employer.
TRUSTS
TERMINATION - RULE AGAINST PERPEruIEs - Green 'v. Green, 9
Ohio Misc. 15 (P. Ct. 1966). - In a declaratory judgment action, plaintiff
sought to have a trust created by his father's will declared void as violat-
ing the rule against perpetuities. The trust was to terminate upon the last
to occur of certain specified events, one of which was, 'The day the young-
est living child of my son ...in being on the date of my death, attains
twenty-five (25) years of age." The rule against perpetuities requires all
interests to vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after a life or
lives in being at the creation of the interest. The plaintiff argued that since
it was possible for the children to die before attaining the age of twenty-
five the interest would never vest, thereby violating the rule against per-
petuities.
The court held that attainment of age twenty-five was not a condition
precedent to the vesting of the remainder and that therefore the possible
failure of the remainder to vest was unrelated to the rule against perpetuities.
WILLS
ELECTION - NATURE AND GROUNDS IN GENERAL - In re Estate of
Moseley vi. Moseley, 9 Ohio St. 2d 13, 222 N.E.2d 639 (1966). - This
case was instituted as a probate proceeding in Ohio by the surviving spouse
of a deceased New Jersey resident. At the time of the testator's death,
he owned real estate in Ohio. The spouse, likewise a resident of New
Jersey, filed in the Ohio courts an election not to take under her husband's
will but rather to take her distributive share of the real estate under the
Ohio statute of descent and distribution - an election not available in




The court in reaching its decision used the rationale that to allow the
laws of another state to govern this area would destroy the certainty and
convenience in determining title to land in Ohio. Such certainty was a
strong reason for construing the statutes so as to allow the widow to elect
to take under the statute rather than being forced to take under the will.
WOMUKMN'S COMPENSATION
LIMITATIONS ON RIGHT TO AwARD - MuNICIPAL PENsION FUNDS -
City of Akron v. Thomas-Moore, 9 Ohio App. 2d 33, 222 NXE.2d 787
(1967). - Decedent, husband of the claimant, sustained a serious injury
in the course of his employment as a fireman which accelerated his death.
After the injury, decedent sought and received payments from both the
state workmen's compensation fund and a municipal pension fund. In
accordance with OHio REV. CODE § 4123.02, the dollar amounts of periodic
municipal pension fund payments are deductible from state workmen's
compensation fund payments. After the decedent's death, claimant filed
for and received the full statutory death award from the state and con-
tinued receiving the municipal pension. The municipality unsuccessfully
contested the claimanes right to participate in the states compensation
fund without deduction.
The court of appeals, without citing authority, held that the statutory
provisions authorizing the deduction patently apply only to policemen and
firemen and that therefore their widows are eligible to receive the full
death award in addition to the municipal pension.
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